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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Israel has three functions: it is the
Supreme Court of Civil Appeals, the Supreme Court of Criminal
Appeals, and the Court of Administrative and Legislative Re-
view. The Review Division of the Court, known as the High
Court of Justice, attracts the most attention and enjoys the
greatest respect of the Israeli public.
The explanation for the esteem in which the common Israeli
citizen holds the High Court of Justice can perhaps be found in
an often quoted, non-controversial statement made in a 1969
case: "This Court is the safest and most objective stronghold of
the citizen in his discord with the Government."1
What was true some twenty years ago has by now become
even more so. But since then, and especially during the last dec-
ade, the balance of weight has changed. It has moved from the
concept of the Court resolving disputes between the citizen and
the authorities, to the concept of the Court safeguarding the rule
of law: "The function of the H[igh] C[ourt] of Justice is to as-
sure the realization of the principle of the Rule of Law."12 This
reflects a different judicial philosophy of the function of the Ju-
diciary as a review court: resolving disputes is related to private
law; the function of review is in the field of public law.
This new concept of the role of the High Court is responsi-
ble for a dramatic change in the Court's openness to deal with
matters from which previously it had carefully veered away. Its
reluctance to enter the arena of public controversy has been re-
placed by liberal rules of standing and justiciability that now
bring it to involvement with matters even of political contro-
versy, which less than two decades ago was inconceivable.
Several causes may have combined to bring about this
change: the disillusionment and loss of confidence of the public
in the political institutions, as a result of the deterioration of our
political culture which "on occasion reached a political eclipse; '
the growing respect and trust in the Supreme Court; the gradual
1. H.C.J. 287/69, Meron v. Minister of Labour, 24 P.D. (1) 337, 362, (Justice
Berinson).
2. H.C.J. 910/86, Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 42 P.D. (2) 441.
3. H.C.J. 1635/90, Zerjevsky v. The Prime Minister, 45 P.D. (1) 748, (Deputy Presi-
dent Elon).
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departure from the English legal tradition which was prevalent
in the Mandate days and in the earlier years of the State of
Israel; the growing influence of American constitutional con-
cepts; and, the coincidence of a younger, more activist genera-
tion of Justices.
II. STANDING
The statutory source of the High Court's review jurisdiction
is in the Basic Law: Judiciary. It is couched in broad terms, to
grant relief against public bodies performing functions under
law. It does not define these bodies or the status of the peti-
tioner. Israeli law does not, however, recognize the actio popu-
laris, or action on behalf of the public.
Through the years, the High Court has established rules for
exercising its discretion to grant relief. These rules are not based
on legal theory; they are intended as a practical guide for self
restraint - as a self-defense.
In the development of these rules one can follow a move-
ment, at first slow and gradual, towards liberalization: from the
stringent requirements for standing - of a lis by a petitioner
with a claim for the infringement of a legal right - to a gradual
mitigation satisfied with an interest, not necessarily a legal right
and not necessarily special to the petitioner, but common to him
and many others - not necessarily proven properly, but proven
to reasonable likelihood. Later came more rapid and substantial
developments, recognizing two exceptions to the actio popularis
by allowing standing to a petitioner who could show no interest
of his own, provided: 1) he raised an argument which indicates
corruption on the part of a Governmental authority; or, 2) he
raised a problem of salient constitutional character. This frame
has included matters of elections and political parties' funding
by the State, the duty of the Broadcasting Authority to observe
principles of freedom of expression, and matters that are the
core of the democratic regime or our society's constitutional
structure.
By the late 1980's these exceptions were generally accepted.
They became the "classic" approach. In one case, standing was
allowed to six Members of Parliament and eleven academics who
petitioned against the refusal of the Minister of Justice to extra-
1993]
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dite an Israeli citizen to France.' Public petitions have also been
heard against the Minister of the Interior for failing to introduce
Summer Time5; against the pardon granted by the President of
the State before conviction (a petition by law professors, Mem-
bers of Parliament and practicing lawyers - more than twenty
in all);' against the Attorney General; 7 against the Advocate
General of the Army for non-prosecution;8 a petition, in 1990,
also by a number of Members of Parliament and academics,
against the validity of political coalition agreements;9 and other
petitions all in matters of deep public controversy.
The example of petitioner Ressler1" is illuminating. Ressler,
a practicing attorney and an officer in the military reserve, peti-
tioned against the Minister of Defence for granting deferment
from military service to Yeshiva (Rabbinical Seminary) stu-
dents. The issue is one of acute public controversy. It involves
strong contradicting views on religious and political matters.
The deferment has been, through the years since the State of
Israel was established, a cornerstone of a status quo political co-
alition agreement with the religious minority parties, without
which no coalition has ever been formed. Three petitions on this
issue had been dismissed for lack of standing: one in 1970,11 and
two by Ressler in 198912 and 1982.13 Ressler's application for ad-
ditional hearing of one of them was also dismissed.1" In 1986,
probably aware of the changing position of the Court, Ressler
tried again. This time he won on standing but lost on the merits.
The Court held the Minister's decision lawful and the use of his
discretion legitimate, being within the range of reasonableness.' 5
The main opinion in the last Ressler case,16 on the whole
4. H.C.J. 852, 869/86, Aloni v. Minister of Justice, 41 P.D. (2) 1.
5. H.C.J. 217/80, Segal v. Minister of the Interior, 34 P.D. (4) 429. This is known as
daylight savings time in the United States.
6. H.C.J. 428, 429, 431, 446, 448, 463, Barzilai v. The State of Israel, 40 P.D. (3) 505.
7. H.C.J. 935, 940, 943/89, Ganor v. Att'y Gen., 44 P.D. (2) 485.
8. H.C.J. 425/89, Tzopan v. Att'y Gen., 43 P.D. (4) 718.
9. H.C.J. 1635/90, Zerjevsky, 45 P.D. (1) 748.
10. H.C.J. 910/86, Ressler, 42 P.D. (2) 441.
11. H.C.J. 40/70, Baker v. Minister of Defense, 24 P.D. (1) 238.
12. H.C.J. 448/81, Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 36 P.D. (1) 81.
13. H.C.J. 179/82, Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 36 P.D. (4) 421.
14. A.H. 2/82, Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 36 P.D. (1) 708.
15. H.C.J. 910/86, Ressler, 42 P.D. (2) 441.
16. Id.
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with the consent of the panel, marks a leap in liberalizing the
standing of a petitioner without an interest. The "classic" ap-
proach would have sufficed. The petition could easily have come
under the second exception, as a salient constitutional problem.
But it expresses a far reaching obiter, calling for more liberaliza-
tion in the exceptions to the actio popularis. Referring to the
"classic" exceptions it states that the first exception should not
be limited to cases of corruption solely, but should be extended
to any case in which petitioner points to a grave defect. It also
states that the second exception should not be limited to consti-
tutional matters, but should extend to all cases in which the pe-
tition is of a public character that directly concerns the promo-
tion of the rule of law and the delineation of guidelines
necessary to ensure its observance in actual practice, as well as
to issues of extraordinary legal substance that concern the prin-
ciples of the rule of law. However, these are just milestones; rigid
categories should be avoided. The list is not exhaustive. It
should remain flexible to include additional situations, such as
cases which by their nature do not affect any personal interest.
The greater the defect complained of, the more prominent the
character of the dispute, the more it affects the public at large,
the fewer are the holders of rights and interests. All the more
reason in such cases to recognize the public petition. Access to
the Court is the cornerstone of the rule of law. Closing the
Court's doors to the public petitioner in such situations would
mean refraining from performing the Court's duty to maintain
the rule of law by imposing it on the Governmental authority.
This is a far cry from the position of the Court in 1970 in the
first military deferment petition, according to which the more
public and political the character of the subject matter of the
petition, the more strict the Court would be on the standing of
the petitioner, requiring infringement of a private right.
With such flexible standards as suggested in Ressler,17 it
will fall to the "expert feel" of the Justices to filter the petitions
and discern those deserving from those non-deserving of stand-
ing, to distinguish between a publicity seeking petitioner and a
petitioner motivated by a bona fide interest in the rule of law.
Not all are in agreement with this new development. Justice S.
17. H.C.J. 910/86, Ressler, 42 P.D. (2) 441.
1993]
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Levine criticizes it severely in an article entitled, Does the Right
of Standing Have a Standing?18 in which he states that he de-
clines to be a "legal policeman" on the guard of the rule of law,
and sees his function as a judge in the traditional duty to resolve
disputes. Justice Levine is concerned with the detrimental effect
of liberal standing on the status of the Court. An interesting
suggestion he makes is to establish an Authority, with powers
somewhat similar to those of the police, to receive and investi-
gate complaints from the public for serious breaches of the law
by the authorities in matters of general public importance and,
in the appropriate cases, to take the matters to the Court.
Be it as it may, the seed has been sown. For better or for
worse, depending on one's view of the doctrine of standing, the
new "unclassic" exceptions to the actio popularis are generally
becoming "classic." The uncertainty that was to be expected
from their flexibility has lessened with time as standards were
refined by the Court's decisions. By now, the State hardly ever
questions the standing of public petitioners in matters of general
or constitutional importance.
III. JUSTICIABILITY
Ressler is a landmark not only on the doctrine of standing,
but on the doctrine of justiciability as well. It dealt with a mat-
ter that touched sensitive political and religious nerves in an
acute public controversy. Nonetheless, the High Court held
unanimously that it was a justiciable controversy.19
While standing determines whether the Court should listen
to the petitioner, justiciability decides whether it should deal
with the issue he raises on the merits. Justiciability does not
concern jurisdiction. It concerns whether the Court should exer-
cise its discretion to use jurisdiction; whether the petition is
suitable to judicial hearing.
The concept of the main opinion in Ressler, in legal theory,
is that justiciability has two meanings: 1) the normative, i.e., the
existence or non-existence of applicable legal norms and legal
standards to resolve the dispute; and, 2) the institutional, i.e.,
18. 39 HAPRAKLIT 453 (1990).
19. H.C.J. 910/86, Ressler, 42 P.D. (2) 441.
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whether or not the court is the proper institution to do so. First,
everything is normatively justiciable. There is no act to which
the law does not apply; everything is a legal matter in the sense
that the law takes a position as to whether it is permitted or
forbidden. There is no legal void; where there is a legal norm
there are also legal standards to implement the norm. Reasona-
bleness is such a standard. In the Zerjevsky case,20 where this
theory was challenged by the Deputy President in a minority
opinion, it was also explained in defense of the theory in Ressler
that even acts of human relationship, in the realm of morals, are
governed by law in the sense that they are within the liberties
permitted by law. The law also applies to political matters be-
cause "political" matters may at the same time be "legal" mat-
ters, though the legal standards applicable to them may some-
times be different. In exceptional matters such as making peace
or war, a petition will be dismissed not because of absence of
normative justiciability - the powers of Government to make
peace and war are regulated by law - but because they are le-
gal. 21 This is how normative justiciability works.
Institutional justiciability, on the other hand, determines if
the matter is appropriate to be resolved according to legal stan-
dards by the court. Ressler22 deals with the various arguments
for holding disputes of political character nonjusticiable. It re-
fers to the matters considered nonjusticiable in the opinion of J.
Brennan in Baker v. Carr23 as examples representing a general
approach according to which matters of political character
should be nonjusticiable, and deals with them accordingly. First,
as to the infringement of the principle of separation of powers,
the conclusion the Court reaches is that there is nothing in this
principle to justify the objection to justiciability. Rather, it is
the principle of separation of powers that justifies judicial review
of the Executive's actions, including those of a political nature.
Review is the function of the Court, guaranteeing that each of
the three branches of the State acts lawfully within its powers.
20. H.C.J. 1635/90, Zerjevsky, 45 P.D. (1) 748.
21. Compare J. Brennan, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979): "the power to
declare war is justiciable. It must be resolved as a matter of constitutional law, not politi-
cal discretion."
22. H.C.J. 910/86, Ressler, 42 P.D. (2) 441.
23. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Second, the Court in Ressler also thinks the idea of detri-
ment to a democratic regime is unfounded. The tension between
majority rule and individual rights, which is the essence of a
democratic regime, is well served by judicial review. Democratic
regime does not mean hermetically closed barriers between the
three branches. The modern idea of separation of powers means
balance. Judicial review ensures that the majority opinion finds
expression in its legal frame according to the constitution,
namely, in the House of Representatives, in Parliament. Acts of
the Executive will be confined within the legal bounds defined
by the majority vote and the Judiciary will review their legality.
Thus a balance is created between the separate powers. There is
no reason why political acts of the Executive should not also be
subject to review. The Court does not apply political review. It
applies legal review instead. It is not the idea of a democratic
regime that the majority may act unlawfully.
Third, the Court believes that the most serious argument
for nonjusticiability is the impairment of the confidence of the
public in the Court; that is, the need to protect the Court
against the politicalization of adjudication. In truth, there is no
objective ground for this argument, for even when the Court
deals with political issues, it does not examine them by political
standards or standards of political wisdom, but by legal stan-
dards. There could, however, be a subjective ground. The public
may not distinguish between judicial review and political review.
It might identify the legal decision with a political position.
The High Court has been aware of this danger. It expressed
its awareness in several cases. For example, in Shalit24 the ques-
tion raised was "who is a Jew?", a question which will always
remain elusive and controversial, cutting along the line between
religious and secular Jews. The Court also voiced it in the Elon
Moreh case"3 which dealt with the legality of a Jewish settle-
ment in the occupied territories, a matter of sharp political dis-
pute between the political right and left. The Court decided that
the settlement on privately owned land was illegal because the
military need for it was not the predominant consideration.
24. H.C.J. 58/68, Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23 P.D. (2) 477.
25. H.C.J. 390/479, Dwaikat v. The Government of Israel, 34 P.D. (1) 1.
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[W]e have valid (legal) sources for deciding (the dispute) and no
need - and are indeed proscribed, whilst sitting in judgment -
to interpose our personal views as citizens of the State. It is, how-
ever, still greatly to be feared that the court will appear to be
abandoning its proper place and descending into the arena of the
public debate, and that its decision will be received by one part of
the public with acclamation and by another part with utter emo-
tional rejection. In this sense I regard myself here as bound by
the obligation to decide in accordance with the law in every mat-
ter duly brought before the court, knowing well from the outset
that the public at large will not pay attention to the legal reason-
ing but only to the final conclusion, and the proper status of the
court as an institution is likely to be prejudiced in taking a stand
proper to it, beyond the disputes which divide the public. But
what else can be done? That is our task and our duty as judges.26
The Court repeated its awareness of the danger in Barzilai17
in which the issue that aroused great public agitation was the
pardon granted by the President of the State to members of the
Security Service before conviction. In all these cases the Court
decided with reluctance that, although the public will not under-
stand that reviewing does not mean taking a stand in the contro-
versy, it has to descend into the arena of public debate because,
as judges, this is their task and they may not disclaim it - just
as C.J. Marshall said as early as 1821 in Cohens v. Virginia:2 8
"We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."29
Would self restraint make a difference? Will it operate to
ensure the confidence of the public in the Court? This is doubt-
ful. If the public has difficulty in understanding that the admis-
sion of a petition does not amount to ideological or political as-
sent with the public or political issue, will it better understand
that dismissing it does not amount to dissent? The fear that we
will not be understood exists equally whether we decide to hear
the petition or not.
In Ressler ° J. Barak said:
26. Id.
27. H.C.J. 428, 429, 431, 446, 448, 463, Barzilai, 40 P.D. (3) 505.
28. 6 Wheat 269 (1821).
29. Id.
30. H.C.J. 910/86, Ressler, 42 P.D. (2) 441.
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I am less afraid of judicial occupation with "political matters"
leading to politicalization of adjudication than I am of the court's
reluctance to deal with political matters leading to the violation
of the rule of law and shattering the public faith in law.
3 1
And quoting from an earlier case he added: "There is a danger
of disrupting the faith of the citizen in the rule of law if we dis-
claim the power vested in us. ' 2
The operative decision in Ressler" on institutional
judiciability, that the matter was appropriate to be dealt with by
the Court according to legal standards, was clear and unani-
mous. Not so clear is its theoretical conclusion:
What conclusion arises from our analysis of institutional jus-
ticiability (or rather non justiciability)? . . . the conclusion is that
this doctrine is most problematic; that its legal foundations are
shaky, and that it is based to a large extent on "irrational rea-
sons"; that it should be approached with due caution; that there
will be room to consider its employment only in special cases,
where the fear of harming the public's faith in the law; and that
the list of such cases is not closed, but will be decided ultimately,
according to the experience of judicial life and the expert feel of
the judge. 3 4
There were also reservations by the President about the far
reaching theory that all matters are judiciable, and about its ap-
plicability to all political matters. A disagreement on similar
grounds was expressed also by the Deputy President.3 5 He
stated that the legal theory of Ressler is based on legal-mathe-
matical assumptions and academic distinctions, where what is
needed is the expert feel of the judge. He rejects the idea that all
matters are subject to legal norms and standards. Human rela-
tions - family and social relations - are based on moral norms
and are outside the area of legal ordering. He does not accept
the open-frame standard of reasonableness as applicable to all
matters, and questions whether there is a point in even posing
the question of how a reasonable political party would have ac-
31. Id.
32. H.C.J. 295/65, Oppenheimer v. Minister of the Interior, 20 P.D. (1) 309.
33. H.C.J. 910/86, Ressler, 42 P.D. (2) 441.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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ted under the circumstances.
It is clear, however, that the range of matters considered as
non-judiciable has been substantially restricted. The prevalent
opinion is that they are limited to questions that are obviously
of military character or predominantly of political nature.
Mr. Ressler made an important legal precedent on standing
and on justiciability. He won on both, but he lost on the merits.
The Court held that the Minister's decision on the military
deferment of the Yeshiva students was not unreasonable, but
left the door open for a new petition to show that the increasing
number of deferred students presents a security consideration
for the Minister to reweigh, if it was so.
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The concept of the Court's function as a safeguard of the
rule of law also finds expression in the scope of the Court's re-
view of the head of the criminal justice authority - the Attor-
ney General himself.
It had been the rule that the decision of the Attorney Gen-
eral to institute or to stay proceedings is subject to review on
one ground only - the ground of bad faith. With time it was
extended to also include the grounds of arbitrariness and ulte-
rior considerations. This remained the rigid frame until the early
1980's when a few more particular grounds of review were recog-
nized by the Court's decisions such as considerations contrary to
public interest or extreme unreasonableness.
The first sign of change came with an obiter in a 1981 case 6
calling to place the review of the Attorney General's decisions
on the same footing as that of all other public authorities, which
are subject to the review of the High Court by the standards of
Israeli judge-made administrative law.
It was not long before this obiter caught on. It has been
adopted where the Attorney General had decided not to order a
police investigation of a petitioner's complaint for contempt of
court, despite his own opinion that it showed a good prima facie
case. The Court ordered him to do so, holding the reasoning for
36. H.C.J. 329/81, Noff v. Att'y Gen., 37 P.D. (4) 326.
1993]
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his decision baseless. 7 It was followed in a judgment against the
Advocate General of the Army holding that his decision not to
prosecute a Major General in a military court for grave assault
on some Arab residents of the West Bank was unreasonable.3 8 It
was followed and expounded in the case of a bank's manipula-
tion of bank shares which caused a heavy financial crisis, creat-
ing an expediency for government support of a few billion dol-
lars which it has as yet not been able to recoup. 9 A commission
of inquiry was appointed. Contrary to the commission's recom-
mendations, which remained intact after police investigation,
the Attorney General decided not to prosecute the heads of the
major banks. The Court held that the Attorney General's deci-
sion was materially unreasonable and ordered him to prosecute.
There can be no question that the use by the Attorney Gen-
eral of his discretion in pressing or refraining to press charges is
justiciable, both normatively - the matter clearly is governed
by legal norms and regulated by legal standards - and institu-
tionally - the review does not involve the Court in a political
controversy. In the area of criminal prosecution the Attorney
General holds a most powerful discretion. Such power is imbued
with the danger of abuse, corruption and discrimination if un-
controlled and free from review. Though the Israeli experience
has not proved this, apprehension of uncontrolled power is uni-
versal and ever present.
The Attorney General is not above the law. His decisions,
like the decisions of all public authorities, have to comply with
the standards of Israeli administrative law. His decisions, like
the decisions of all other public authorities, are invalid if they do
not do so. All public authorities are equally subject to judicial
review. So also the Attorney General is not above the Court's
jurisdiction. And just as there is no special law for the Attorney
General with regard to the Court's jurisdiction, so there is no
special law for him regarding the Court's scope of review. The
scope of the Court's review of his discretion should extend to the
full range of review of all public authorities subject to the same
standards. These standards require all to use their discretion in
37. H.C.J. 223/88, Sheftel v. Att'y Gen., 43 P.D. (4) 356.
38. H.C.J. 425/89, Tzopan, 43 P.D. (4) 718.
39. H.C.J. 935, 940, 943/89, Ganor, 44 P.D. (2) 485.
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good faith, with decency, honesty and reasonableness, and free
of arbitrariness, discrimination and ulterior motive. This way
equality before the law is achieved.
With regard to criminal justice, even a petition against a de-
cision of the President of the State who, by statute, is immune
from any legal proceedings, gained a hearing by the Court on a
petition of some practicing lawyers, Members of Parliament and
law professors. whose only interest was in safeguarding the rule
that political figures are not above the law. 0 The petition was
brought against the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General,
and some other functionaries. It concerned the use by the Presi-
dent of his statutory power of pardon. The question raised was
whether the President had exceeded his power by granting par-
don before conviction. The decision by the majority was that he
had not.
V. THE RULE OF LAW AND POLITICS
The increased liberalization of the Court on standing and
justiciability led to its involvement with politics and with the
Knesset, our Parliament.
I should first mention that Israel has no written constitu-
tion. It has a series of Basic Laws. I will explain their nature.
The Declaration of Independence of 1948 refers to a Constituent
Assembly to be elected, which will draw up the Constitution of
the newly born state. The Assembly was elected and then trans-
formed into the Knesset (our Parliament) and disbanded. In
1950 the Assembly - turned Knesset - passed a resolution ac-
cording to which the formal Constitution would be drawn by a
series of Basic Laws. The Knesset has since enacted sporadic
Basic Laws establishing state institutions and authorities such
as the Basic Law: The Knesset; Basic Law: The Judiciary; Basic
Law: The Government; Basic Law: The State Comptroller and
several others. They do not make up a complete constitutional
text. There is no Basic Law: Legislation. A draft was published
only recently.
Until recently we had no Basic Law on human rights. The
law of human liberties was all judge-made. Only in 1992 were
40. H.C.J. 428, 429, 431, 446, 448, 463, Barzilai, 40 P.D. (3) 505.
1993]
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two Basic Laws dealing, very incompletely, with human rights
enacted: Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty.
Although Basic Laws were meant to be temporary substi-
tutes for a formal Constitution, their status is not clear. They
are enacted by the Knesset by the same procedure as ordinary
laws. They require no special majority. It is not clear whether a
Knesset that passes a Basic Law acts so as a Constituent Assem-
bly. A Basic Law is not necessarily entrenched or immune to
change or abolition. Some are, only by virtue of the fact that
changes require a special majority. Others can only be changed
by Emergency Regulations. Still others are not entrenched at
all.4 They have not been accorded constitutional value or status
by the Judiciary. Subject to entrenchment, they have been re-
garded as ordinary laws.
The question of the power of the Knesset to bind itself, and
future Knessets, by an entrenchment clause was raised in 1969
in Bergman v. Minister of Finance2 but was left open. The
Court proceeded with the case on the presumption that it could.
It was thus given a positive answer, by implication.
Recently, in a 1989 case, one Justice's opinion stated that a
Knesset passing a Basic Law does so as a Constituent
Assembly."'
We recognize the power of the Knesset to act as a Constituent
Assembly and draw Basic Laws which will make up the various
chapters of the Constitution."
This statement was made in the narrow context of an entrench-
ment clause but it is more far reaching; it gives a Basic Law,
entrenched or not, the normative superiority of a constitution
over any ordinary law:
41. One, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) has the following en-
trenchment clause:
There shall be no violation of rights under the Basic Law except by a Law fitting
the values of the State of Israel, designed for a proper purpose, and to an extent
no greater than required.
42. 21 P.D. (1) 693.
43. The opinion was that of Justice Barak in Laor Movement v. Chairman of the
Knesset, 44 P.D. (3) 529.
44. Id.
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Within this frame we recognize the power of the Knesset - act-
ing as a Constituent Assembly - to entrench provisions of Basic
Law against amendments - whether by ordinary law or by Basic
Law - by ordinary majority ... In the contest between the en-
trenchment clause and a provision reaching amendment without
the special majority it requires, the principle which gives norma-
tive superiority to the entrenched Basic Law will prevail.45
So far this is only a single opinion, not the opinion of the Court.
A. The Knesset
Israel's political regime is a parliamentary democracy. Our
Parliament, the Knesset, is the apex of the triangle of powers of
the State. It is the Representative Assembly of the State.46 Due
to our countrywide relative system of election, though, the elec-
tors vote for parties, and it is the parties which make up their
lists of representatives to the Knesset. The Knesset is the Su-
preme legislator. From it emanates all law. By its law the Judici-
ary is appointed and exercises jurisdiction.
The Judiciary is independent - "A judge is subject to no
authority but the authority of the law.' 7 The Government is the
executive branch of the State.'8
There is a separation between the three branches of the
State, with checks and balances in their mutual relations. The
Judiciary exercises review jurisdiction over all public bodies per-
forming functions under law,49 including Governmental authori-
ties, and also over the Knesset, as we shall soon see. The Knes-
set has control over the Executive - "Government is
responsible to the Knesset" and "Government serves by virtue
of the confidence of the Knesset. ' ' 50 Unlike a presidential democ-
racy, in a parliamentary democracy it is the Parliament (in
Israel - the Knesset) which constitutes the Executive, by its
vote of confidence:
When a Government has been formed it will appear before the
45. Id.
46. Sec. 1, Basic Law: The Knesset.
47. Sec. 2, Basic Law: The Judiciary.
48. Sec. 1, Basic Law: The Government.
49. Sec. 15, Basic Law: The Judiciary.
50. Secs. 2 and 3, Basic Law: The Government.
1993]
15
PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW
Knesset, present its platform ... and request the Knesset's confi-
dence. Government will be constituted upon the vote of
confidence. 1
And just as the Knesset constitutes the Executive by its vote of
confidence, so it can depose the Executive by its vote of no-con-
fidence. This feature is indeed so crucial and characteristic that
some writers on constitutional law consider it as the exclusive
criterion of a parliamentary regime.52 The Knesset also has some
quasi-political functions.
The authority of the Court to review acts of the Knesset is a
constitutional problem of the greatest importance. It is the prob-
lem of the relations between the Legislature and the Judiciary.
The source of the authority of review of the High Court is in the
Basic Law: the Judiciary. The Judiciary has power to review the
acts of public authorities performing functions under law. The
Basic Law does not distinguish between the Knesset and other
public bodies. It does not distinguish, for that matter, between
the different functions subject to review. The problem is, there-
fore, not a problem of jurisdiction but of discretion - of the
degree and extent to which the Court should exercise its author-
ity or should practice judicial restraint. The answer varies with
the different functions of the Knesset, and the political element
they involve.
1. Quasi-judicial decisions
Quasi-judicial decisions are the least political of the Knesset
functions. These decisions include removing members (by the
plenum) of the Knesset convicted of criminal offenses and sen-
tenced to at least one year's imprisonment, by a process similar
to the United States' process of impeachment. They also include
the suspension of membership (by the House Committee) pend-
ing final judgement and service of sentence, and the removal (by
the plenum on motion by the House Committee) of a member's
immunity in relation to a criminal charge (unconnected with his
51. Sec. 15, Basic Law: The Government; A. RUBINSTEIN, 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF ISRAEL 479.
52. H. KLINGHOFFER, DAS PARLAMENTARISCHE REQIERUNGSSYST IN DEN EUROPXISCHEN
NACHKRYEGSVERFASSUNGEN, (Stuttgart, 1928); K. Klein, The Legal Definition of the Par-
liamentary Regime and Israeli Parliamentarism, 5 MISHPATIM 308, 313.
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functions as a member of Knesset). The exercise of these powers
is subject to certain conditions and certain procedures stipulated
by statute.
As quasi-judicial, these decisions should be exercised ac-
cording to legal standards. There is no reason then why they
should not be reviewed in the same way as the decisions of
quasi-judicial tribunals."' It is, therefore, only normal that such
decisions should be subject to the Court's full scope of review.
But this was not so until 1985.
In 1981, the Court petitioned to restrain the House Com-
mittee from dealing with an application for the removal of a
member's immunity54 stating: "As is well known this Court does
not interfere in the proceedings of the Knesset and its
committees." 55
Later the same year, the Court decided (by majority of 4-
1)56 to review the decision of the House Committee to suspend
membership, but limited it to the question of whether the com-
mittee had exceeded its power - whether the pre-conditions of
the basic law which regulate such matters were fulfilled. It was a
question of an interpretation of the statute. The then Deputy
President stressed:
We are not dealing here with a "political" question, nor with the
legislative function of the Knesset or one of its committees, but
with the judicial or quasi-judicial function... The Knesset Com-
mittee cannot possibly have immunity from judicial review in ex-
ceeding this function, and cannot finally determine the limits of
its own powers. 7
In the minority opinion, the then President expressed serious
doubts about whether the Court should interfere with the
Knesset5 8
In 1985, the Court was finally ready for full scope review of
a quasi-judicial decision of the Knesset. It was the first time the
Court had interfered (by majority of 3-2) with a decision of the
53. Compare, Powell v. McCormick, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969) (the unconstitutional ex-
clusion of an elected Congressman from his seat by a House resolution).
54. H.C.J. 96/81, Abu Hazeira v. The House Committee, unreported.
55. Id.
56. H.C.J. 306/81, Flatto Sharon v. The House Committee, 35 P.D. (4) 118.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Knesset plenum. 9 The decision involved removal of a member's
immunity on the ground of his public expression of identifica-
tion with PLO terror. The Court made it clear that its review
was not limited to the test of functional jurisdiction of the Knes-
set to take the decision. It examined the basis for the decision,
including the evidential foundation and the motive. The removal
of immunity, it said, is not meant as punishment for past behav-
ior, but for prevention of future danger of unlawful behavior.
There was not enough to substantiate such danger, nor had the
causal connection been considered by the plenum between the
removal of the immunity and the prevention of possible future
danger from the petitioner. The petition was granted and the
decision was declared void.6 0
2. Intra-Parliamentarian decisions
The most evident transformation during the 1980's was the
Court's actual intervention in intra-Parliamentarian decisions.
Such decisions concern the internal management of the Knesset
and its organs. They can be a powerful instrument to achieve
political ends. They are of obvious political character, and were
never included in the sphere of review of the High Court, until
1981.
In a 1981 petition,61 though dismissed, the Court took the
opportunity to make clear its new position on the issue of review
of such decisions. It evolved standards for intervention which
have later been applied in actual interference to invalidate some
decisions. The subject of the petition was a decision of the
Chairman of the Knesset to postpone, by several hours, a propo-
sal already scheduled for a vote of no confidence in the Govern-
ment. It was argued, but not established, that the decision was
motivated so as to enable Government supporters to arrive from
abroad in time to vote. It was also agreed that the Chairman
cannot legitimately serve as "an instrument in the hands of the
Executive."6
The Court dismissed the argument that the subject of the
59. H.C.J. 620/85, Miari v. The Knesset Chairman, 41 P.D. (4) 169.
60. Id.
61. H.C.J. 652/81, Sarid v. The Knesset Chairman, 36 P.D. (2) 197.
62. Id.
[Vol. 5:1
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/1
ISRAELI SUPREME COURT
petition is non-justiciable. The procedure of the Knesset is regu-
lated by the Basic Law: The Knesset, and by the Knesset Rules
made under it. The Knesset and its organs must abide by their
procedure. The Court stated that in reviewing intra-parliamen-
tarian decisiong it should strike a balance between two consider-
ations: on the one hand, the principle of the rule of law which is
binding on all including the branches of Government and, first
and foremost, on the Knesset - the rule of law in the law maker
itself; and, on the other, the unique status of the Knesset and
the principle that intra-parliamentarian activities are an internal
matter of the House dealing with politics. This state of conflict-
ing considerations calls for a balanced judicial review based on
self restraint, but short of complete fettering, according to the
standard that:
[T]akes into account the degree of harm (in the decision subject
to review) to the web of parliamentary life and the extent of its
effect on the fundamental structure of our constitutional regime."3
The test prescribed focuses on the core and disregards the pe-
riphery. The decision under consideration - the postponement
by several hours of a scheduled debate on a motion for non-con-
fidence (even if wrongly motivated) - failed to meet this
standard.
This standard was later applied to dismiss petitions in sev-
eral cases which did not answer the above test: against the deci-
sion of the Knesset plenum to change the composition of a
Knesset committee in order to replace its chairman64 ; the deci-
sion of the Knesset Chairman to fix a date for a vote of no confi-
dence, in some deviation from Knesset rules""; and others. On
the other hand, it intervened when the Chairman refused to
schedule a motion for non-confidence by a one member faction
on what the Court held to be a wrong interpretation of the
Knesset Rules, and of a Resolution of the House Committee and
precedents.6 The matter was of fundamental significance. A
vote of no confidence is a matter of vital importance to the con-
stitutional regime and parliamentary life. It is the most useful
63. Id.
64. H.J.C. 482/88, Reisser v. Chairman of the Knesset, 42 P.D. (3) 142.
65. H.J.C. 1179, 1180, 1181/90, Ratz v. Chairman of the Knesset, 44 P.D. (2) 31.
66. H.J.C. 73/85. "Kach" v. Chairman of the Knesset, 39 P.D. (3) 141.
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measure at the disposal of the opposition, and the most effective
means of control and supervision of the whole legislative branch
over the executive. The matter was justiciable. It contained no
element of political consideration, and no relation to the repug-
nant racist platform of the faction.
Another petition of the "Kach" faction (named for its rep-
resentative Kahana 7 ) concerned two bills that it submitted to
the Presidency of the Knesset (the Chairman and his deputies).
The Knesset rules require the Presidency to confirm the bills
before they can be put before the plenum. The Presidency re-
fused to do this because of their racist contents. The Court in-
tervened. It decided that the Presidency's authority to confirm
bills for submission to the House is confined to their legal frame
and does not extend to their contents. The Presidency has no
authority to ground a bill because of its social-political contents,
repugnant as they may be. Once the faction has been allowed to
participate in the elections and its representative has been
elected, it cannot be prevented from trying to realize its political
platform. The matter is a fundamental violation of parliamen-
tary life - legislation being one of the central functions of Par-
liament. The petition was, therefore, granted. A third petition,
also against the refusal to confirm "Kach" bills, was dismissed.
By then the Knesset had amended its rules to prevent confirma-
tion of bills that are racist in essence. The attempt, in 1985, to
challenge the amendment in Court failed. 8 Later, after an
amendment of the criminal law prohibiting racist activities, the
faction was debarred from the elections. Its only impact on Is-
raeli public life is its contribution to the development of our
constitutional law.
It is worth mentioning that, in deference to the Knesset, the
Court did not make an operative order in these petitions. It
made only declaratory orders, which cannot be enforced. For
this reason a further petition by Kahana for contempt of Court
had to be dismissed.
67. H.J.C. 742/84, Kahana v. Chairman of the Knesset, 39 P.D. (4) 85.
68. H.J.C. 669/85, 24/86, 131/36, Kahana v. Chairman of the Knesset, 40 P.D. (4)
393.
[Vol. 5:1
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/1
ISRAELI SUPREME COURT
B. Political Agreements
In the 1990's the Court descended into the political arena in
two cases concerning political agreements made between Knes-
set factions towards the formation of a new Government. Politi-
cal agreements are made between parties or factions concerning
the structure and policy of the Government and the way Gov-
ernmental powers are to be exercised. As already explained, in
our electoral system Parliament (the Knesset) is elected by the
people, the electorate, by means of lists of parties. Political par-
ties thus become a constitutional instrument by which the will
of the people takes form. We have a multi-party regime which,
by nature, is based on coalition. Political agreements have be-
come a crucial legal political instrument in the political process,
at least in the process of forming or breaking a Government.
In the first case, two petitions were brought at a time when
each of the two major parties were secretly negotiating for shady
political bargains with the small parties, without which none
could have a majority to form the Government. The nature of
some of the promises made aroused public concern. It was al-
leged that they were contrary to public policy. The agreements
were secret. The first petition was to make them public. 9 The
free flow of information to and from the public is key to the
operation of a democratic regime. The public depends on it to
obtain the facts necessary to form decisions on matters of gov-
ernment. Such information, which is at the core of democracy,
also includes information on political agreements. Just as the
electors should have knowledge of the party's platform in order
to form a political position, so they should know the contents of
political agreements that bring changes in the platform. Elected
members of the Knesset also have to know of such changes
before they take the vote of confidence in the new Government.
The duty to reveal such agreements will have a deterrent effect,
and will thus ensure the legality of their contents. It will enable
public criticism and will strengthen the structure of the regime
and the Government. The duty to reveal also derives from the
position of the parties to the agreement as trustees of the public.
In addition to these sources of public law for the duty to reveal
69. H.J.C. 1601, 1602, 1603, 1604, 1889/90, Shalit v. Peres, 44 P.D. (3) 353.
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the nature of the regime and the character of the political agree-
ment, there is the duty to give information, corresponding to the
freedom of expression, which means not only the right to make
one's opinion heard, but also the right to hear the opinion of
others. On these grounds the petitions were granted and the
Court ordered the agreements to be made public. In doing so,
the Court established the general duty to reveal political agree-
ments. For the prescription of specific arrangements, the Court
called on the legislature.
This was a case of judicial activity in developing the law;
but then, most of our administrative as well as constitutional
law is judge-made. Just as we have no formal, written Constitu-
tion, we also have no code of administrative law. Indeed, the
human liberties were all judge-made. The normative sources on
which we rely are the fundamental principles and basic values of
our system as a free democracy, which we recognize as the very
soul of our system, though not written upon a book. These in-
clude such principles as equality, the duty of honesty and good
faith, the rules of natural justice, and the human liberties
themselves.
In the second case 70 the Court invalidated a certain clause
of the agreement on the grounds of public policy, having reached
unanimity that the matter was justiciable - "there are legal
norms governing it and legal standards to apply to it and there
is a judge to review" it 71 (in converse of the old Hebrew saying
that there is no law and no judge, denoting lawlessness).
I ought to also mention the Deputy President's dissenting
opinion concerning the intervention with the Knesset, especially
with its intra-parliamentarian decisions. It is less concerned with
the loss of prestige by the Court as the result of the politicaliza-
tion of adjudication, as with the loss of status and fortitude of
the political authorities. In his minority opinions in Kahana,72 in
Miari,73 and in Zerjevsky 74 the Deputy President takes a strong
stand against excessive intervention with and for more deference
70. H.C.J. 1635/90, Zerjevsky v. The Prime Minister, 45 P.D. (1) 748, (Deputy Presi-
dent Elon).
71. Id.
72. H.C.J. 742/84, Kahana, 39 P.D. (4) 85.
73. H.C.J. 620/85, Miari v. The Knesset Chairman, 41 P.D. (4) 169.
74. H.C.J. 1635/90, Zerjevsky, 45 P.D. (1) 748.
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to the Knesset which, of the three branches of the State, is the
only one elected by direct vote of the public and is the source of
the law and the authority of the Judiciary. He stressed that by
the concept of separation of powers the Knesset is responsible to
the people. It is the people who will judge it on the judgment
day of the elections - but not very likely in our political cul-
ture, many will say. The Court should exercise more self-re-
straint toward the Knesset and leave it free to its business with-
out interfering with its regular and efficient functioning. In this
the Deputy President is in the minority.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concept that the High Court's role is to resolve disputes
has given way to the concept that its role is to safeguard the rule
of law. In the name of the rule of law, the Court became actively
involved in matters of political character from which it had re-
coiled before, more actively perhaps than courts in other coun-
tries. Explaining its intervention with an intra-parliamentarian
decision, the Court said:
Our fortitude lies in meticulous observation of the rule of law and
the legality of Government .... [i]nsistence on the rule of law,
including the rule of law in the legislature, and on the structural
foundation of our constitutional regime is the soul of our national
existence.7 5
The Israeli experience shows that liberalization on matters
of standing and justiciability has not flooded the Court with
public petitions nor, judging by the relevant opinion of the legal
community, has the Court's status been impaired in the eyes of
the public by descending into the political arena. On the con-
trary, the public's respect and confidence in the Court seems to
have been enhanced. I would like to think that we have satisfied
at least some of the public's high expectations. We are being
sensitive to the public's feelings and views. There is an old He-
brew saying that the Judge sits in the midst of his people. We
are aware of the public's disillusionment with the political sys-
tems, and of the reasons that are responsible for this. It was in
response to this state of things that the Court overcame its re-
75. H.C.J. 742/84, Kahana, 39 P.D. (4) 85.
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luctance and, in full responsibility to the public, rose to the need
to restore faith in the country's constitutional institutions. The
Court did so by introducing healthier norms into political life
and by making it clear that nobody is above the law - that all
are equally subject to the rule of law not excluding those who
play a role in public and political life. In so doing the Court has
acted with care, keeping a delicate balance and restraining itself
by centering only on the core - on matters that have a serious
effect on the fabric of our parliamentary life and the structure of
our constitutional regime. Some of the new norms are now in-
cluded in the Basic Law: Knesset, by an amendment enacted af-
ter the Zerjevsky case. 6
Professor Zamir, a Professor of Administrative Law at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, wrote recently that the Court
has thus far proceeded in this field with caution and wisdom."
May it be able so to continue.
76. H.C.J. 1635/90, Zerjevsky, 45 P.D. (1) 748.
77. Itzhak Zamir, Courts and Politics in Israel, PUBLIC LAW 1991, 523.
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